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ABSTRACT
NowadaysWireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are used in many
application contexts. Data handled by WSN are required to
be protected for privacy reasons since they can be directly
or indirectly related to individuals. The problem of pre-
venting the identification of individuals starting from their
data, known as anonymity, is a fundamental requirement for
privacy aware systems.
This paper proposes a solution to guarantee anonymity
for a wide spread type of WSN by means of privacy policies.
The solution is based on a UML model that introduces the
conceptual elements and guidelines that are needed to build
privacy policies for WSN.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) [2] technologies support
data collection and distributed data processing by means of
very small sensing devices. Nowadays, sensors are used in
many contexts such as surveillance systems, systems sup-
porting traffic monitoring and control in urban/suburban ar-
eas, military and/or anti-terrorism operations, telemedicine,
assistance to disabled and elderly people, environmental mon-
itoring, localization of services and users, industrial process
control.
Privacy aware mechanisms are required for several WSN
applications such as localization and telemedicine systems.
However, it is necessary to take into account privacy also
in those application contexts in which the data of individu-
als are not directly handled by WSN. In fact sensor nodes
continuously store and elaborate a large amount of informa-
tion, and although the managed information usually consists
of raw scalar data (e.g., the current temperature, pressure,
and so on) not directly related to people, an in-depth anal-
ysis of those data may reveal information on individuals.
However, the low power resources, the poor computational
and storage capabilities of sensor nodes impose severe con-
straints on how these requirements can be satisfied.
Among the different aspects of privacy, anonymity is an
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important requirement for a privacy aware system that aims
at protecting the identity of the individuals whose data are
handled by the system.
In order to achieve such a goal we propose a solution based
on privacy policies that besides constraining the actions that
can be executed on the sensed data hide the identity of the
nodes. In fact, in different application scenario starting from
the identity of the sensor nodes it is possible to retrieve
directly or indirectly the identity and the behaviour of an
individual. For example, in home networks in order to pro-
vide advanced services to improve the quality of human life
and to guarantee energy saving, sensor nodes collect a large
amount of data such as humidity and temperature that may
reveal individuals’ habits breaking their privacy.
This paper proposes a conceptual model that provides a
sound foundation for the definition of privacy policies in the
context of Wireless Sensor Networks. The model, which
extends the work presented in [5], is defined in UML[14, 15]
and represents a general schema that can be easily adopted
in different contexts.
The model introduces concepts, such as nodes, data, ac-
tions, that are needed in order to define a privacy policy
along with the existing relationships among them.
The paper also illustrates the definition of a privacy policy
that guarantees anonymity for a wide spread type of WSN.
The policy is built starting from the concepts and the guide-
lines imposed by the conceptual model, and consists in the
definition of exchanged messages and actions (executable by
nodes) organized by means of communication protocols.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2
introduces the foundations for modeling privacy in the con-
text of WSN and proposes the conceptual model; Section 3
illustrates the anonymity problem by proposing a solution
built on the conceptual model; Section 4 presents some re-
lated works; finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions and
provides hints for future works.
2. MODELING PRIVACY POLICIES FOR
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
A privacy policy defines the way in which data referring
to individuals can be collected, processed and diffused ac-
cording to the rights that individuals are entitled to.
The rest of the paper adopts the terminology introduced
by the EU directive [6]. Since the proposed terms are gen-
eral, i.e., they are not dedicated to a specific type of network,
it is required that they are refined to provide the concepts
that are necessary to support the definition of privacy mech-
anisms concerning the communication in WSN.
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• personal data in general means any information related
to an identified or identifiable natural person (referred
to as data subject or subject). In the context of WSN
they represent the data that are sensed by the nodes
of the network, in other words, the role of subject
is played by the nodes since they receive information
from the environment where they are located.
• processing of personal data (processing) means any op-
eration or set of operations which is performed upon
personal data, whether or not by automatic means,
such as collection, recording, organization, storage, a-
daptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use,
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise
making available, alignment or combination, blocking,
erasure or destruction. Besides the above operations,
in the WSN context further activities can be defined
such as sensing data (of different nature), transmit-
ting messages to other nodes, receiving/retransmitting
messages. Moreover, a node is also capable to perform
operation on data and messages such as data aggre-
gation, data encryption/decryption and data integrity
verification.
• controller in general means the natural or legal per-
son, public authority, agency or any other body which
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data; in WSN
the role of controller is played by the nodes of the net-
work. A controller verifies the processing actions that
handle sensed data.
• processor means a natural or legal person, public au-
thority, agency or any other body which processes per-
sonal data on behalf of the controller; in WSN the role
of processor is played by the nodes of the network.
• the data subject’s consent (consent) means any freely
given specific and informed indication of his/her wishes
by which the data subject signifies his/her agreement
to personal data relating to him/her being processed.
The meaning is the same also for WSNs.
As a distinctive feature of a privacy policy, the processor
is required to state for what purpose data are processed. A
purpose can be defined either as a high-level activity (e.g.,
“monitoring”, “tracking”) or as a set of actions (e.g., “com-
pute the average temperature”, “evaluate the humidity”).
The general goal of a WSN is to collect data sensed from
the nodes that are distributed in the environment. Data
once sensed are elaborated by nodes and transmitted, by
means of messages, to other nodes that in turn receive, elab-
orate and retransmit the messages until reaching the sink.
The actions of data elaboration, message transmission, re-
ception and retransmission are processing actions executed
with the purpose of communicating the results of the dis-
tributed computation to the sink. In other words, the pur-
pose associated with the processing actions is the general
functional goal of the network. A node that performs pro-
cessing actions plays the role of processor. Notice that a
node may also play the role of controller. For instance, a
node can be required to verify the integrity of the data con-
tent of a retransmitted message with respect to the original
message that was transmitted to the network.
Notice that the processing actions may be executed under
specific obligations. Obligations are a set of actions that
processor and controller guarantee to perform at the end of
the processing activities. As an example, consider a node of
a network that keeps track of the temperature of the ground.
Whenever the temperature is less than 1◦ C, the node has
to send an alert message to the sink stating that the ground
is about to freeze.
In a privacy aware system, subjects have to grant their
consent before any processing could be executed on their
data. We assume that the consent is implicitly given by the
nodes of the network. A node that belongs to a WSN ac-
cepts that its data can be the target of different processing
activities. The processing activities consist in the set of pro-
cessing actions (and obligations) that can be executed by
the single node of the network, while the general purposes
associated with such processing actions represent the com-
putational goals of the whole network system. This type of
implicit consent requires that the system modeler adopts ad-
equate mechanisms to assure that a node trusts the network
in which it wants to operate.
2.1 The UML Model
In the following we give a short overview of the conceptual
model for privacy policies.
Figure 1: The Privacy Policy Class Diagram
The structural aspects are defined using UML classes and
their relationships such as associations, dependencies and
generalizations. Figure 1 depicts a class diagram that pro-
vides a high level view of the basic structural elements of
the model.
A WNS-PrivacyPolicy is characterized by three types of
classes: Node, Data and Action. Nodes interact among them
inside the network in order to perform some kind of actions
on data. Thus, an instance of WSNPrivacyPolicy is charac-
terized by specific instances of Node, Data and Action, and
by the relationships among such entities.
Let us focus on the classes introduced by the diagram:
• Node represents a member of the network either inter-
ested in processing data or involved by such a process-
ing. Nodes are characterized by functions and roles
(see Figure 2). More specifically:
– Role [13] is a key concept of this approach; nodes
are characterized depending on the role they play
with respect to privacy. Role is extended by three
distinct classes to represent the different roles:
Subject, which is a node that senses the data, Pro-
cessor, which is a node that processes data by per-
forming some kind of action on them (e.g., trans-
mission, retransmission, aggregation, etc.) and
Controller, which is a node that verifies the ac-
tions executed by processor nodes.
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Figure 2: The WSN Privacy Class Diagram
– Function represents the task performed by a Node
within the network in which it operates (e.g., data
sensing, message transmission, message retrans-
mission, data aggregation, etc.).
• Data represents the information referring to subjects
that can be handled by processors. Data is extended
by means of Identifiable data (e.g., node identifier),
Sensitive data (e.g., health related data) and Sensed
data (e.g., temperature, pressure). Identifiable data
represent the information that can be used to uniquely
identify nodes. Sensed data contain information that
are sensed by the nodes of the network. Finally, Sensi-
tive data represent information that deserve particular
care and that should not be freely accessible.
In the WSN context, sensitive data may be considered
an extension of sensed data, i.e., they are sensed data
related to individuals which require a particular care.
For instance, in telemedicine applications a sensitive
datum is the temperature which is sensed by nodes
positioned on the body of patients.
Notice that in the context of WSN also common sensed
data deserve particular care. For example, consider a
wireless meter reading system used to monitor the tem-
perature and pressure of different rooms of the building
where it is installed. Such a system comprises several
sensor units which communicate information on the
current temperature, barometric pressure, and humid-
ity of the rooms where they are positioned. Although
the data sensed by the nodes of the system cannot be
classified as sensitive, they can be used to reveal infor-
mation on personal habits of the people who live in the
interested building. As an example, slight increments
of temperature or of humidity may reveal the presence
of one or more person in a room. By analysing such
data it is possible to infer periods of the day or of the
week during which the building is empty. Notice that
such information might be exploited by potential bur-
glars.
Data is a complex structure composed of basic infor-
mation units, named Fields. Each field represents a
partial information related to the whole data struc-
ture.
• Message represents the basic communication unit ex-
changed by the nodes of the network. Message con-
tains Identifiable information concerning the nodes in-
volved in the communication and Sensed data.
• Action represents any operation performed by Node.
Action is extended by Obligation, Processing and Pur-
pose. Moreover, each action can be recursively com-
posed of other actions. Since in a privacy aware sce-
nario a processing is executed under a purpose and
an obligation, Processing specifies an aggregation re-
lationship with Purpose and Obligation.
We propose the following actions as some of the most
common operations performed in WSNs:
– sensing, which represents the acquisition of data
concerning a specific feature of the system where
the node is located. For instance, the monitoring
of temperature, pressure or humidity.
– transmission, which consists in transmitting a mes-
sage containing data that were sensed by the cur-
rent node.
– reception, which consists in receiving a message
sent by another node of the network
– retransmission, which consists in transmitting a
message containing data that were sensed by other
nodes of the network.
– verification, which consists in checking the integrity
of the data contained in a received message. In
case any inconsistency is discovered, possible coun-
termeasures are taken, such as sending a warning
message to the sink.
– data aggregation, which consists in aggregating
data starting from the data contained in the re-
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ceived messages, that will be sent to other nodes
by means of the action transmission.
Notice that while in general for each function there may be
defined several actions that can be performed, in the context
of WSN usually, each function corresponds to one action.
In order to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of
data as well as to assure that only authorized nodes are
allowed to access data and execute actions, our model intro-
duces encryption mechanisms. More specifically, two classes
representing encryption keys, named DataKey and Func-
tionRoleKey, are introduced. The former class is used for
the definition of encryption mechanisms to protect the data
content of messages; while the latter is used for defining
mechanisms to assure that message communication and data
handling are executed only by authorized nodes. Each node
of the network owns a different DataKey used to encrypt the
data content of the messages. Each node also owns multiple
FunctionRoleKey that are used to constrain which nodes are
allowed to execute specific actions on data. Actions are ex-
pressly built to be executed by nodes that belong to a given
function-role combination. Since a node may play different
functions and roles, it may own multiple function-role keys,
one for each pair of function-role.
Notice that the system modeler is allowed to use the key
generation algorithm and the encryption algorithm that he/she
considers the most suitable for the application domain.
Figure 2 depicts the aforementioned entities along with
their relationships by means of a UML Class diagram. For
instance, the dependency relationship between Action and
Data means that data are processed by actions, while the
association between Subject and Data expresses data own-
ership.
3. THE ANONYMITY PROBLEM
Anonymity is a fundamental requirement for privacy aware
systems, which aims at preventing the identification of sub-
jects starting from their data. In the context of WSN the
aim is enforced by preventing the identification of nodes that
sensed data starting from the messages that are exchanged
within the network. A significant example that depicts the
importance of the anonymity requirement is shown by WSN
used in military applications. As an example consider a net-
work composed of nodes that sense the temperature and that
are located on ground behind the enemy lines. The sensed
data generated by each node may be used to determine the
presence of enemy troops in the region where the sensor is
positioned. Hence, it is required that it cannot be possible
to identify which node generated a sensed datum by sniffing
the messages transmitted by the network.
3.1 Reference scenario
We consider a dense network composed of n nodes, with
n ∈ ℵ, each of which senses a given type of data (e.g., tem-
perature, pressure, brightness, position and so on). Each
node directly communicates with its closer neighbours (at
one hop distance). The broadcast nature of wireless chan-
nels enables a node to determine, by snooping the channel,
whether its packets are received and forwarded by its neigh-
bors, for any kind of MAC layer [21]. Each node waits a
random time before re-transmitting the message in order to
reduce the collision probability.
The aim of communication is to provide the sink with the
data sensed by the nodes of the network.
Each node of the network is characterized by a label Ni,
with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, which unambiguously identifies the node in
the network.
Each node owns different types of keys each of which cor-
responds to a given Function-Role pair. We identify the fol-
lowing Function-Role pairs: Sensing-Subject, Authenticator-
Processor, Transmitter-Processor andNotifier-Controller. A
key is described by means of the following notation k(nd, fr),
where nd and fr represent the node that owns the key and
the Function-Role played by such a node, respectively. More
specifically, nd = N1..Nn and fr = {ss, ap, tp, nc} where
ss represents the label associated with the Function-Role
Sensing-Subject, ap with Authenticator-Processor, tp with
Transmitter-Processor and nc with Notifier-Controller. For
instance, the Sensing-Subject key of node Ni is represented
by k(Ni, ss).
Notice that in the proposed solution keys are pre-shared
in the nodes.
We assume that each node is also equipped with a table
where it stores the last sent messages. The usefulness of the
table will be clarified in the following sections.
3.2 The proposed solution
The proposed solution starts from the classification of
data, functions and roles played by the nodes described by
the previously presented conceptual model.
3.2.1 Message structure
In order to define anonymity mechanisms in a WSN, the
messages handled by the nodes of the network need to be
suitably structured. More specifically, a message contains
data that according to the conceptual model may be clas-
sified as identifiable and sensed. Identifiable data includes
the information that can be used to identify a node. Sensed
data includes all information sensed by the nodes, such as
the environmental temperature, pressure and so on.
A message represents the object of a single step of the
communication towards the sink, more specifically it refers
to a single transmission hop between adjacent nodes. A
message is identified by means of the notation msgx,d where
x represents the node that generated and transmitted the
message, while d identifies the message among those gen-
erated by node x. The pair x,d unambiguously identifies
the message among those trasmitted within the network. A
sensed data before reaching the sink passes through different
nodes of the network (multi-hop communication) by means
of different messages. In order to guarantee the integrity and
confidentiality of the end-to-end communication, we propose
a message structure that keeps track of the two last hops of
the transmission. This condition will allow us to implement
a basic enforcement schema that checks the integrity of the
data content of the message.
A message msgx,d, is a tuple
msgx,d = 〈current, previous, subject, data〉 where:
• current is a tuple current = 〈Nx, d〉, which unambigu-
ously identifies the current message among the ones
transmitted within the network. It includes Nx, the
identifier of the node that is going to transmit the mes-
sage and d, an identifier of the message among those
generated by node Nx.
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• previous is a tuple previous = 〈Ny, e〉, which includes
Ny, the identifier of the node that operated the second
last (re)transmission of the sensed data contained in
the current message and e, the idenfier that node Ny
associated with such a message.
• subject is a tuple subject = 〈Nz, f〉, which includes
Nz, the identifier of the node subject, which originally
sensed the data, and f , the identifier that such a node
associated with the message that started the commu-
nication of the sensed data towards the sink.
• data is a tuple data = 〈sd, er, si,mi〉, which includes
the data sensed by the subject node and additional
fields used for error notification.
– sd (sensed data) contains the data that were sensed
by the subject
– er (error) is a flag that indicates an anomaly was
identified in the message content.
– si (sensing identifier) is a tuple si = 〈Nv, g〉, which
contains the identifier of the node that sensed the
data and the identifier of the message transmitted
by such a node.
– mi (mistaking identifier) is a tuple mi = 〈Nw, h〉,
which contains the identifier of the node that gen-
erated the error and the identifier of the message
containing the error transmitted by such a node.
Notice that sensing identifier, mistaking identifier are
used only in case of error notification, i.e., when error
is set to true, as it will be described in the retransmis-
sion & verification protocol.
We assume that x, y, z, v, w ∈ (1..n] and d,e,f ,g,h ∈ ℵ.
3.2.2 Behavioral aspects
The dynamics of the system are described by means of the
following protocols:
• sensing, which defines the actions that a node of the
network executes to sense data and to communicate
such data to the other nodes of the network.
• retransmission and verification, which defines the ac-
tions that a node must perform to retransmit data re-
ceived from other nodes, and specifies the actions that
a node must execute in order to verify the integrity of
the messages that are transmitted within the network.
Both protocols make use of cryptography in order to im-
plement anonymity. Notice that at this level we do not need
to consider any particular encryption technique. The pro-
posed solution is independent from encryption algorithms.
The system modeler is allowed to use the technique that
he/she considers the most suitable for the application do-
main. The usage of encryption is denoted by the notation
en(pc, key), where en is an encryption function,
en : String × String → String that taken a plaintext pc,
and a key key, returns the cipher-text cc.
3.2.3 Sensing protocol
1. Data sensing. The node Nz senses a data sd from
the environment where it is located. Notice that in
this case the node plays the Role of Subject and the
Function of Sensing.
2. Data encryption. The node encrypts the sensed data
sd by using its Sensing-Subject key k(Nz, ss)
1. The
resulting output is denoted en(sd, k(Nz, ss))
3. Message identifier generation. The node generates an
identifier for the message that has to transmit to the
sink 〈Nz, f〉
4. Identifiable data encryption. The node encrypts the
generated identifier by using its personal Transmitter-
Processor key, k(Nz, tp). As a result we have the con-
tent en(〈Nz, f〉, k(Nz, tp))
5. Message structuring. A new message msgz,f is gener-
ated starting from the resulting outputs of steps 2 and
4. The resulting message is structured as follow:
– current is set to en(〈Nz, f〉, k(Nz, tp)) since the
current transmitter is the subject itself.
– previous is initialized to an empty string. This is
the first transmission, no retransmission has been
executed yet.
– subject is set to en(〈Nz, f〉, k(Nz, tp)).
– data is set to en(sd, k(Nz, ss)).
6. Message storing. The node stores the content of the
encrypted field data in its local table. It uses the con-
tent of the field current en(〈Nz, f〉, k(Nz, tp)) of the
message msgz,f as the hash key for the sensed data
that have to be stored.
7. Message transmission. The node waits for a random
time and transmits the message msgz,f to its closer
neighbours (at one hop distance).
3.2.4 Retransmission & verification protocol
1. Message reception. The node Nh (with 0 < h < n) re-
ceives the messagemsgr,v = 〈cr,v, pr,v, sr,v, dr,v〉, where
cr,v, pr,v, sr,v, dr,v represent the fields current, previ-
ous, subject and data, respectively.
2. Role check. The nodeNh analyses the message in order
to understand what type of action it has to execute on
the contained data. More specifically, it looks for the
message among those stored in the local table by using
the encrypted content of field previous as hash key.
If the message is not found then this means that it was
not previously transmitted by node Nh. In this case
the nodes goes on playing the role of Processor and
the function of Transmitter by executing the following
steps required for the retransmission of the message.
a) Message identifier generation. The node gener-
ates a new identifier for the message, 〈Nh, t〉, which
will be retransmitted towards the sink
b) Identifiable data encryption. The node encrypts
the identifier by using its personal Transmitter-
Processor key k(Nh, tp).
1The Sensing-Subject key is equivalent to the DataKey de-
fined in the conceptual model
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c) Message structuring. A new message msgh,t =
〈ch,t, ph,t, sh,t, dh,t〉is generated starting from the
resulting output of step b) and the encrypted con-
tent of the field current, subject and data of the
received message msgr,v. As a consequence, the
resulting message is structured as follows:
ch,t = 〈en(〈Nh, t〉, k(Nh, tp))〉, ph,t = cr,v, sh,t =
sr,v, dh,t = dr,v
Notice that field previous of the new messagemsgh,t
is equal to field current of the received message
msgr,v since current and previous are updated at
each retrasmission.
d) Message storing. The node stores the content of
the encrypted field data in its local table. It uses
the content of the field current of the message
msgh,t, i.e., en(〈Nh, t〉, k(Nh, tp)), as the hash key
for the sensed data that have to be stored.
e) Message transmission. After a random time the
node transmits the message msgh,t to its closer
neighbours (at one hop distance)
Otherwise, if the message is found then it means that
it was originally transmitted by node Nh itself. In this
case the node changes its current function and role,
i.e., it has to play the role of Controller and the func-
tion of Notifier to verify the integrity of the previously
transmitted message. Hence, the node compares the
encrypted content of field data of the received message
with the encrypted data extracted from its table.
If the data match, this means that the Controller is
sure that the node from which it received the message
preserved the integrity of the data content. In this case
no additional action is performed by the node.
If the data do not match, the content of field data is
different from the data extracted from the local table
or no data entry corresponds to the search key. This
means that something wrong happened. In this case,
the node generates a new message to notify the sink
that a corrupted message is spreading through the net-
work.
a) Message identifier generation. The node gener-
ates a new identifier, 〈Nh, t〉, for the messagemsgh,t
that will be retransmitted to the sink
b) Identifiable data encryption. The node encrypts
the resulting identifier by using its personal Trans-
mitter-Processor key k(Nh, tp).
c) Message structuring. A new message is generated
starting from the resulting output of steps b), the
encrypted content of the field current, subject and
data of the received message msgr,v. The result-
ing message is structured as follows:
- current is set to en(〈Nh, t〉, k(Nh, tp)).
- previous is a copy of the field current, cr,v, of the
received message
- subject is set to en(〈Nh, t〉, k(Nh, tp))in order to
specify identifiable information of the node that
retrieved the error. Notice that since such a node
is the current one, the content of subject is equal
to current.
- data contains: 1) a code that specifies that the
current message is an error message; 2) the field
subject of the received message, sr,v, which con-
tains the identifier of the node that sensed the
data and started the transmission and the iden-
tifier of the first message generated by it; 3) the
field current of the received message, cr,v, which
contains the identifier of the node that made the
mistake2; 4) the correct data, sd, that was stored
in the local table en(sd, k(Nz, ss)).
The whole content of field data is encrypted with
the Notifier-Controller key of the current node
k(Nh, nc).
en(errorcode, sr,v, cr,v, en(sd, k(z, ss))〉, k(Nh, nc))
d) Message storing. The node stores the content
of the encrypted field data in its local table. It
uses the content of the field current of message
msgh,t, en(〈Nh, t〉, k(Nh, tp)), as hash key for the
field data that have to be stored.
e) Message transmission. After a random time the
node transmits the message to its closer neigh-
bours (at one hop distance).
3.2.5 Towards trust
The previously described protocol supports both the ano-
nymity and the confidentiality of the communication among
the nodes of the network. A further requirement concerns
the trust of the communication, in other words it is re-
quired that only authorized nodes are allowed to commu-
nicate within the system. A step towards the achievement
of this requirement can be done by using an authenticator-
processor key that is known by all the nodes of the network.
Notice that before each transmission and retransmission
the node could encrypt the involved message with its authen-
ticator key. The aim of this encryption phase is to assure
that the transmitter is a trusted node of the network since
it knows and uses the membership key of the network. It
is also required that a node that receives an “authenticated”
message decrypts it by using its authenticator-processor key
before handling its content for elaboration or retransmis-
sion purposes. This mechanism prevents external untrusted
nodes from spreading and accessing messages that are trav-
elling across the network.
Although the usage of this encryption mechanism may
improve the level of trust among the nodes of the network, it
requires computational resources that are relevant for nodes
of a WSN. In such a scenario the number of encryptions/de-
cryptions is equal to the number of message transmissions
and receptions.
This scenario can be effectively applied whenever the nodes
are characterized by adequate computational capabilities and
battery units. Hence, the proposed solution could be applied
to the next generation of sensor technologies [1, 19].
3.2.6 Enforcement
Privacy policy enforcement consists in verifying the com-
pliance of the actions performed by node with a given pri-
vacy policy. In general, there are two different ways in which
2Notice that such a content as well as the one of field sub-
ject are taken from the received message, and are encrypted
with the key of the previous node and of the Subject node,
respectively.
2221
such a verification can be carried out: the first way consists
in providing ex-post enforcement mechanisms that is, the
controls are done after all the actions related to a policy are
performed (e.g., audit-based mechanisms). The second one
consists in having run-time enforcement mechanisms that is,
the effect of every action is checked before actual execution.
The conceptual model supports the definition of both types
of enforcement mechanisms. The proposed solution, built on
the conceptual model, provides an example of how it is pos-
sible to define both types of enforcement mechanisms. The
ex-post mechanism is implemented in the Retransmission&
verification Protocol, when Controller checks the integrity of
the retrasmitted message under the obligation to notify an
error message to the sink in case something is wrong. The
run-time mechanism is implemented when the basic proto-
col is extended by means of trust management mechanisms.
In such a case an authenticator-processor key is used, which
assures that communication is effectively perfomed by nodes
belonging to the network.
3.3 Final remarks
The proposed solution satisfies the anonymity require-
ments since it proposes mechanisms that mask the identity
of subject nodes.
The separation of sensed data from identifiable data, and
the adoption of encryption techniques make it more difficult
to associate sensed data with the identity of the node that
sensed them. The computation effort that it is required to
support the anonymity is limited as well as the overhead and
delay. The solution also supports the check of the integrity
of the messages that are exchanged.
4. RELATED WORKS
WSN applications require to collect a huge amount of data
that may be used to violate directly or indirectly the privacy
of individuals. Notice that the risk of violation increases
due to both the wireless nature of the communication chan-
nel and the remote access. Exploiting such vulnerabilities
the following common threats against sensor privacy may
occur[10, 4]:
• Eavesdropping: malicious users could easily discover
the communication content listening to data.
• Masking: some malicious nodes may mask their real
nature behind the identity of nodes that are autho-
rized to take part to communication, and misroute the
packets.
The available solutions defined to guarantee privacy in WSN
starting from their vulnerabilities and related threats may
be classified into two main groups: anonymity mechanisms
based on data cloaking [10, 17] and privacy policy based
approaches [7]. Data cloaking anonymity mechanisms per-
turbs data following some kind of criterium, for instance K-
anonymity guarantees that every record is indistinguishable
from at least k-1 other records [18].
In [10, 9, 17, 8] four main data cloaking anonymity ap-
proaches3 are proposed:
• Decentralize Sensible Data: the basic idea of this ap-
proach is to distribute the sensed location data through
3notice that [10, 9] are specific for cloaking localization in-
formation
a spanning tree, so that no single node holds the com-
plete view of the original data.
• Secure Communication Channel: the use of a secure
communication protocols, such as SPINS [16], reduces
the eavesdropping and active attack risk by means of
encryption techniques.
• Change Data Traffic: the traffic pattern is altered with
some bogus data that obfuscate the real position of the
nodes.
• Node Mobility: the basic idea is to move the sensor
nodes in order to change dynamically the localization
information, making it difficult to identify the node.
For instance, [10] proposes a solution that guarantees the
anonymous usage of location based information. More specif-
ically, such a solution consists of a cloaking algorithm which
regulates the granularity of location information to meet the
specified anonymity constraints. This work only focuses on
localization services and therefore, constrains the middle-
ware architecture required to support the proposed algo-
rithm. Hence, such a solution cannot be considered a general
context independent anonymity approach.
Privacy policy based approaches [11, 20, 7] state who can
use individuals data, which data can be collected, for what
purpose the data can be used, and how they can be dis-
tributed. A common policy based approach addresses pri-
vacy concerns at database layer after data have been col-
lected [20]. Other works [12] address the access control and
authentication issues, for instance Duri et al.[7] propose a
policy-based framework for protecting sensor information.
The Mist routing project for mobile users [3] combines loca-
tion privacy with communication aspects. It faces the source
location privacy problem by designing ad hoc routing pro-
tocol that keeps the location private from source to routers.
Our work provides a contribution in the field of privacy
policy based approaches by defining a role-based context-
independent solution that guarantees anonymity of the nodes
before sensed data are collected into a database. Our solu-
tion may be combined with both data cloaking mechanisms
and some other privacy policy based approaches.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The present work proposed a conceptual model for the def-
inition of privacy policies in the context of Wireless Sensor
Networks. The proposed model provides the basic concepts
involved when dealing with the management of privacy-related
information in a WSN. Basic elements such as the concepts
of message, action, node, sensed data are represented by
means of UML.
The choice of using UML is motivated by the fact that
such a notation is well known by a wide range of analysts
and modelers that operate both in software and system engi-
neering fields. Moreover, UML can be used for representing
concepts at different levels of abstraction. Even though the
model is described at a very high level, it can be easily ex-
tended and adapted for specific application domains.
This paper also proposes one of these applications con-
cerning theWSN anonymity problem. Such a problem states
that it cannot be possible to identify the nodes which sensed
data starting from the messages that are exchanged within
a network.
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The model provides the conceptual foundations that are
required to build anonymity assurance mechanisms, such as
the separation of sensed from identifiable data, and the clas-
sification of roles and functions. The proposed solution con-
sists in protocols that state the structure of the messages
that can be exchanged in the network, the keys and the en-
cryption mechanisms that are required to protect the com-
munication in the network and in all the activities that are
required to support anonymity.
The proposed solution is general and can be easily adopted
for different types of WSN, from simple networks where
nodes sense data and transmit them without any further
elaboration, to network supporting advanced form of data
aggregation. The proposed solution is also independent from
the types of data that are sensed and handled by the nodes,
hence it can be applied to simple networks that sensed the
temperature of the environment, as well as to multimedia
sensor networks whose nodes may exchange audio and video
signals.
At present we are experimenting the application of the
proposed solution by using simulation tools with the aim to
identify possible changes that could diminish the computa-
tional power and memory usage with the aim to improve the
network performances.
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